Walking in the Shoes of the Brain: an "agent" approach to phenomenality and the problem of consciousness by Bruiger, Dan J.
Walking in the Shoes of the Brain: An “Agent” Approach  
to Phenomenality and the Problem of Consciousness 
 
by Dan Bruiger  
dbruiger [at] telus [dot] net 
June 2018 
 
 
Abstract: Given an embodied evolutionary context, the (conscious) organism creates 
phenomenality1 and establishes a first-person point of view with its own agency, through 
intentional relations made by its own acts of fiat,2 in the same way that human observers create 
meaning in language.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Beginning with Leibniz, it has seemed to many that there is an unbridgeable category 
gulf between one’s conscious subjective experience and objective events in the brain3 that 
presumably cause it. Even though many neural correlates of consciousness have been 
identified, it remains unclear how physical processes could bring about vivid conscious 
subjective states such as feelings, sensory experience of color, smell, sound, and touch, as 
well as more subtle experiences such as memories, mental images, volition, thoughts, and 
dreams. Indeed, it remains unclear why in a material world there should be any such 
thing as conscious experience or exactly what purpose it serves [Chalmers 1995].  
 Part of the problem is that the method and ontology of science have excluded 
from consideration the very subjectivity and teleology that are the traditional fundaments 
of mind, so that the challenge to understand the mental in strictly physical terms of 
efficient causation understandably meets with frustration. The traditional obstacle to 
understanding mind in a materialist framework is that a causal explanation is sought for 
processes that must rightly be considered intentional. It is thus necessary to regard the 
physical brain not only as a causal system, but quintessentially as an intentional or virtual 
system as well—an agent with its own purposes and point of view distinct from those of 
the scientific observer. Therefore, let us here consider a system such as the brain to be 
such an agent as well as being a patient (in the archaic sense of the term). The challenge 
will be to understand the role of intentionality in mental agency, why it is required for an 
explanation of consciousness, and how and why an agent creates its phenomenality. 
                                                
1 For clarity, I use the term ‘phenomenality’ to refer to the entire domain of what can enter 
consciousness, which includes sensory experience, emotion, imagination and memory, dreams, 
thought, etc. In short, everything for which there is “something it is like” [Nagel 1974] to be in 
that state. In many cases, it will refer in context to sensory experience. 
2 Wiktionary: fiat: “An arbitrary or authoritative command or order to do something; an effectual 
decree.” Online Etymological Dictionary: “ ‘authoritative sanction,’ from Latin fiat ‘let it be 
done’…, third person singular present subjunctive of fieri ‘be done, become, come into 
existence’…, used as passive of facere ‘to make, do.’” 
[http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=fiat] 
3 I use ‘brain’ as an abbreviation for the whole information-processing system of an embodied 
environmentally embedded organism with a co-evolutionary history among other organisms—not 
merely the central nervous system or the matter inside the skull.  
 The computational metaphor has been widely used for insight into the 
representational aspect of the mental, but widely criticized for endorsing a view of mind 
as disembodied. It has also been challenged for keeping the terms of discussion within 
the framework of efficient causation associated with mechanism [Rychlak 1994]. Yet, the 
deeper significance of computation as an approach to mind may be just the opposite of its 
mechanist association. Despite assimilating mind to machine ontologically, it invokes the 
intentionality of the human programmer who is, so to speak, epistemically put in the 
shoes of the brain. One is thereby positioned to grant the system itself a point of view.  
 Toward this end, I propose the active and autonomous nature of mental agency as 
original cause, the very opposite of the traditional passive dependence of the physical 
that is enshrined in the notion of efficient cause. Reductive explanation in this context 
will not appeal to efficient causes transmitted throughout a physical system, as identified 
by an external observer. Rather, the system will be treated as an originating cause with a 
point of view and reasons of its own. The appropriate explanatory strategy is then to 
identify with that point of view in order to engage the cognitive tasks facing the system.4  
  
 
2. Distinguishing among agents and points of view 
 
Intentionality is widely held to be a telltale sign of mental agency, to be contrasted with 
the causality that characterizes inanimate matter. Intentionality typically involves 
reference, of something to something else (“aboutness”). However, reference is not a 
property, state, or relationship inhering in or between things, but an action (i.e., 
intending) performed by an agent that needs to be specified. It is an operation of relating 
or mapping one thing or domain to another. These domains may differ in their 
fundamental nature—again, as defined by some agent. A picture, for example, might be a 
representation, in the domain of painted images, referring to a real landscape. (As such, it 
is the painter who first does the referring.) Similarly, a person might represent her 
thought, perception, or intention in a verbal statement, to which others may subsequently 
refer in various ways. The relevant agents, domains, and mappings must be specified 
before intentionality can be properly characterized.  
 The rings of a tree, for example, may seem to track the age of the tree, or periods 
or environments favorable to growth [Montague 2010]. Yet, it is the external observer, 
not the tree itself, who establishes this relationship and who makes the reference or 
connection and does the tracking. Connections made by the tree itself (if such exist) are 
of a different sort. In all likelihood, the tree rings involve causal, but not intentional 
connections. On the other hand, we must assume there are systems besides human beings 
that do the kind of things we mean by referring, intending, and representing. In the case 
of such systems, it is paramount to distinguish clearly the intentionality of the system 
itself from that of the observer. 
 The understanding of intentionality that descends from Brentano generally fails to 
make this distinction, largely because it is tied to human language usage. “Reference” is 
                                                
4 Note that such an approach does not imply an indefinite recursion of agents within agents, but 
points rather to a special executive function within the brain where the buck stops. The interloper 
is the investigating observer, not some part of the system required to serve as another interior 
observer. 
taken for granted to mean linguistic reference or something modeled on it. Intentionality 
is thus often considered inherently propositional, without the explicit caveat that—strictly 
speaking and so far as we know—only people formulate propositions. Toward a more 
useful notion of intentionality, we need a broader notion of ‘proposition’ as an assertion 
or connection made by a system itself, for its own ends and reasons. Intention must be 
thought of in an appropriately abstract sense, as a mapping made by an agent.  
 While human observers, following their own intentionality, make assertions of 
causality, intentional systems in general perform operations that must be viewed in their 
own right, quite apart from whatever physical processes a human observer may propose 
to account for them. This runs counter to Dennett’s [1987] understanding of ‘intentional 
system’ as a system to which a human observer imputes intentionality as a matter of 
convenience, according to the “intentional stance.” Effectively, his bias excludes systems 
other than human beings from having their own intentionality. This reflects the 
longstanding mechanist bias of western science from its inception: that matter inherently 
lacks the power of original causality we attribute to humans (or gods) as agents, and can 
only passively suffer the transmission of efficient causes [Bruiger 2016].  
 The upshot of all this is that the project to explain consciousness scientifically 
requires some distinctions that are often glossed over. One must clearly distinguish causal 
relations (between brain states and environment) from intentional relations. And one must 
distinguish the observer’s speculations from the brain’s actual strategies considered from 
its own point of view. In other words, an observer is free to speculate concerning both 
causal and intentional connections occurring between organism and world; but, we 
should bear in mind that such speculations are literally assertions made by the observer, 
from her perspective. With that caveat, the observer may propose specific connections 
that she believes the brain (organism) makes, in order to try to understand the latter’s 
intentionality. That is, she may attempt to model brain processes from the organism’s 
own perspective, as involving its assertions, as much as that is feasible from an outside 
perspective. Such modeling is, in effect, an attempt to “walk in the shoes of the brain.”  
 To grasp phenomenality as an expression of a system’s proper intentionality, one 
must also distinguish the phenomenality itself from propositions (facts) that may be 
asserted about phenomenal content or derived from it. While I am the unique witness of 
my own phenomenality, I am also an agent who may formulate propositions regarding its 
content. These enter the public domain when expressed, either as facts about the world or 
about the experience itself. Effectively, an intentional analysis of brain processes is 
obliged to proceed in terms of propositions, as a third-person description.5 This is least 
problematic when dealing with human cognition, since humans are language users who 
normally translate their thoughts into verbal sentences. It is more problematic when 
dealing with other creatures. We must be clear, however, that in all cases the propositions 
concerned are put forward by the observer, even when imputed to the subject or system 
observed, and even when the subject and the observer happen to be the same individual. 
That said, the theorist can do no better than to formulate propositions that theoretically 
correspond to operations of the system in question, putting herself in the place of the 
system to try to fathom its strategies. This does not, of course, imply that a brain “thinks” 
                                                
5 The view that intentional relations necessarily involve propositions, or something like them, has 
been dubbed propositionalism [Montague 2010]. Following Dennett, one might also call it the 
propositional stance. 
in human-language sentences any more than does a computer (which “thinks” rather in 
machine language).6  
  In the perspective presented here, phenomenality is grounded in intentionality, 
rather than the other way around. All mental activity is necessarily intentional, insofar as 
the connections involved are made by the organism for its own purposes. Phenomenal 
states are thus a subset of intentional states, produced by a specialized function within the 
system, and serving a different purpose from non-conscious processes. This does not 
preclude that intentional connections can be about representations or phenomenality, 
since phenomenal content itself can be earmarked as an object of consciousness. The 
point to bear in mind is that two domains of description are then involved. Intentional 
description is the observer’s third-person domain of speculation about the intentionality 
of the subject, while phenomenal description is a first-person description by the subject 
herself. Talk of phenomenality as though it constitutes a public domain—to which 
multiple subjects or the outside observer have access—only leads to confusion.7 
    
 
3. An “agent” approach 
 
As noted, consciousness is a special function, serving a different purpose from non-
conscious representation or simple reflex. While a great deal of human behavior is 
performed without conscious attention, if the action cannot be done by rote, if it confronts 
a novel, demanding, or otherwise mobilizing situation or requires planning and 
forethought, conscious attention is brought into play. This suggests that phenomenality 
makes real-time sensory input available to higher centers to deal with situations that are 
not already handled automatically.8 Phenomenality is “what it is like” to be an agent 
engaged in that special function, which an observer would characterize in terms of the 
agent’s internal operations. The explanatory task is to relate these disparate perspectives 
or domains, rather than to attempt a reduction to efficient causes. 
 Let’s say you experience a tickle in the throat and immediately you begin to cough. 
What is the relation between the tickle sensation and the behavior of coughing? The 
experience does not cause the behavior, in the sense of efficient causation, for scientific 
                                                
6 Similarly, we cannot strictly say that a brain “processes information”, which is a conscious-level 
notion circularly projected back upon the brain that produced it. 
7 Montague [2010], for example, asks whether two people thinking the same thought share the 
same cognitive phenomenology. My answer is no, for two reasons. First, the notion of “the same 
cognitive phenomenology” commits the error described above: a first-person experience is not 
available to multiple subjects; the notion that it could be available derives mistakenly from 
treating it third-personally (as an object in the public world). Second, the “thought” in question is 
probably a linguistic proposition; for two agents to have “the same thought” means only that they 
would express their respective experiences or intentions in identical (or equivalent) verbal 
statements. 
8 While awareness of initiating motor activity, for example, comes after the neural processes that 
have actually caused the activity, this awareness serves as the basis for choosing future action, or 
action in a larger context [Frith and Metzinger 2013]. The conscious experience indicates 
acknowledgment, after the fact, of the particular unconscious processing, and constitutes a 
monitoring function. 
description does not allow anything outside physical processes or entities as causally 
effective. Yet the tickle sensation does play a functional role by representing a state of 
your organism. The tickling signifies a state of affairs upon which you (an agent) might 
act voluntarily, independently of the cough reflex. While coughing behavior can be an 
unconscious reflex, the sensation serves further to inform you about the occurrence of the 
reflex and the condition to which it responds.  
 Similarly, there is more or less programmed behavior associated with other 
sensations, whether somatic (such as itching, pain, hunger, thirst, desire) or externally 
oriented (such as sweetness, bitterness, or attractive and repulsive odors). Certainly, these 
latter sensations bear information about the proximal stimulus and the appropriate 
response. They also bear implicit information about the organism’s priorities. The 
associated behavior contains the meaning to the organism of the sensation—that is, what 
it should do about the stimulus on the basis of its priorities. However, other sensations—
such as provided by sight and hearing—often lack any obvious behavioral concomitant 
and even a proximal stimulus in the above sense. What is the “meaning”, for example, of 
specific color sensations? Yet, even the relatively detached information gathering by the 
visual sense must have its evolutionary roots in affective values [Dennett 1991, p181]. 
The very existence of color categories (hue) indicates an affective significance, since they 
clearly reflect priorities of the organism more than properties of light or surfaces.9  
Having priorities is a matter of intentionality, which doesn’t of itself require 
consciousness. In many circumstances, it is enough to take appropriate non-conscious 
action with regard to various stimuli. In large part, however, the very nature of the 
distance senses removes them from the urgency for immediate response involved in direct 
physical contact, thereby allowing higher-level valuation. Because of distance, there is 
time to consider response on a distinct level of behavior. In contrast, the event with most 
immediate consequence is direct physical contact, of which the sense of touch yields a 
perception in which the phenomenality (where it exists) and the behavior associated with 
it form a unified whole with the valuation underlying them.  
 A paradigm example is pain, which is at once feeling, evaluation, and response. To 
the conscious organism, the meaning of pain lies in the associated behaviors of 
withdrawal, wincing, avoidance, protection of an injured part, etc. But the pain response 
has two phases, corresponding to two neural pathways (c-fibers and a-fibers).10 One is a 
quick (unconscious) reflex reaction—for example, removal of the hand in response to 
contact with a hot surface. The slower response of lingering conscious painful sensation 
reflects an ongoing, internally generated stimulus, which acknowledges the tissue 
damage during the process of healing over time. It comes too late to avoid damage from 
the original encounter, but serves to avoid further or future damage and to facilitate 
                                                
9 Human beings enjoy color vision because they are primates, which occupy a common niche 
with birds and insects. The diets of Old World primates consist significantly of fruits that (when 
ripe) are yellow, orange or red [Tsou 2013]. It makes sense for these food items to stand out as 
significant from a background of foliage. In the forest context, at least, the color red serves to 
alert the creature to something singular. 
10 As Dennett [1978, p200-202] points out, the physiology of pain is more complicated than this, 
involving separate channels through the “old brain” and the “new brain,” and also the possibility 
of other pathways influencing the experience of pain. This does not affect the argument here, 
which concerns the grounding of the felt quality of pain in the associated response. 
healing. It forces the organism to favor that part.11 The associated response is protective 
behavior and (in the case of social animals) expressions of the injured state to others. 
 A similar divide between quick and slow pathways exists in the visual system, 
where an initial fast wave of visual processing happens outside consciousness, and is 
made available to subsystems for immediate responses. This is followed by a slower 
phase of “recurrent processing” that involves integration of various brain areas leading to 
conscious experience [Revonsuo 2010]. There is neurological evidence that 
phenomenality in general involves self-generated efferent nerve activity, as well as 
passively received afferent signals [Ellis 2000, p44].  
 
 
4. How the brain creates phenomenality 
 
How does a system of intentional relations come to have phenomenality? Any answer 
must involve the meaning of these relations to the system itself. I propose that the 
meaning to itself of the brain’s internal connections should be understood on the model of 
the meaning that emerges for a human language user in the acts of reading, writing, 
speaking or hearing speech. A person communicating translates conventional linguistic 
symbols (written or aural) into mental images, thoughts, and feelings, or vice versa. 
Similarly, the brain assigns meaning to its own internal representations, evoking 
phenomenality in the way that words evoke mental images, namely by fiat and 
convention.  
 It might be objected that it is as much a mystery how mental images arise through 
communication as how phenomenality arises. However, more than analogy is involved; 
for, meaning emerges in language and qualia alike through simple predication.12 Qualia 
are thus intelligible meanings asserted by an agent, as are the meanings the language user 
assigns to the babble of spoken syllables, the squiggles on a written page, or the 
significance the mathematician lends to given algebraic symbols by fiat: ‘let x stand for 
such and such...’ By the same token, pain stands for tissue damage, even in those 
instances when there is no actual damage.  
 We do not normally question our own brain’s reasons for its internal connections, 
nor have conscious access to them. Yet, it is only from an observer’s perspective that 
they would appear merely conventional or un-compelling, because the observer is not in 
the position of being the agent that assigns the meaning. It may then appear mysterious 
that neural connections carry or imply meaning at all, and leave us unsatisfied concerning 
the relation between experience and behavior, mental and physical. This is because the 
observer is then, by default, looking for causal connections, while the relevant 
connections are not causal but intentional, even when explainable in causal terms. These 
                                                
11 One may infer that insects, which do not seem to favor damaged parts, do not experience pain 
as a result of such injuries [Eisemann et al 1984]. In my opinion, this justifies the belief that 
insects do not experience anything at all: they have no phenomenality. 
12 The notion of ‘fiat’ here parallels Rychlak’s [1994] ‘predication’, but includes more generally 
the elementary levels of neural connection made by the brain as an agent. ‘Predication’ is tied to 
categorization in the context of Rychlak’s logical approach to the study of human psychology 
[p.15, p.309]. Our views about the nature of ‘agency’ are in general agreement, but a point of 
difference is that he seems to believe that a machine cannot possibly become an agent [p.1].  
respective levels of explanation may overlap in the case of simple behavior, such as 
reflexes. One may then mistakenly think that some stimulus in the environment causes 
the response, without invoking the mediating agency of the organism. The reasons for the 
response in the case of reflex may lie hidden in the organism’s evolutionary history and 
be said to belong to the agency of Nature. 
 Now, evolutionary advantage can explain, for example, the observable behavior 
of color discrimination—and why things appear to be differently colored—but not why a 
particular wavelength of light appears just so and not otherwise. It does not tell us why 
the chlorophyll of foliage does not appear red and the ripe fruit green, which would 
maintain the same relative contrast for discrimination. It does not tell us why it should not 
appear as some unimagined color experience. What is it about the qualitative experience 
of greenness that commends it to represent foliage in the vocabulary of the senses? And 
what about redness commends it to represent things that must stand out against that 
particular background?  
 This is rather like asking why a particular meaning is denoted in a given language 
by a particular word, written and pronounced its specific way, rather than by some other 
symbol. For the native language user, the association of the word with what it represents 
seems natural and unquestionable, though of course it is actually a social convention. The 
internal language of the organism may be no less conventional and historically contingent 
in its use of symbols. Given a symbolic system, some symbol must be chosen. However 
arbitrary, it will inevitably come to seem imbued with the meaning it conveys. Hence, it 
is backwards to ask why grass appears green; rather, greenness is what it is by virtue of 
the association with grass. Given consciousness as a symbolic system, greenness is the 
way we visually experience the totality of associations related primarily to chlorophyll. 
 One can acknowledge the arbitrariness of words because human languages use 
different terms for what is presumably the same phenomenal experience. The 
phenomenal experience itself, however, cannot be compared interpersonally. The 
sensation of greenness, unlike the words green or vert, is not merely a linguistic 
convention interchangeable with other conventions or subject to social change. Rather, it 
is a convention of neuro-logical organization, with the force of long genetic precedent. 
While the words of a natural language are transient and relative to culture, the meanings 
of qualia are more universal and enduring, backed by the relative stability of biology and 
the natural environment. Indeed, the human cognitive system adapts to the distortions of 
colored lenses or filters in such a way that color experience—of verdant foliage, for 
example—is eventually restored to normalcy [Neitz, et al 2002]. The sensation of 
greenness is what it is, and different from the sensation of redness, precisely because of 
the real-world things it refers to in our common evolutionary history, from which it 
cannot be arbitrarily dissociated.13 
 Sensory qualia are thus not something gratuitously added to the information they 
represent, nor are they “caused” by it, any more than words are caused by the things they 
represent. Rather, they are a version of that information an internal agent presents to itself 
synoptically in consciousness. Qualia, in other words, are a way the embodied subject 
first-personally presents to herself physical information that an observer also might detect 
                                                
13 This is why there can be no “inverted spectrum,” which is the “apparent possibility of two 
people sharing their color vocabulary and discriminations, although the colors one sees... are 
systematically different from the colors the other person sees.” [Wikipedia: inverted spectrum]. 
by means of laboratory equipment and describe in terms that are third-personal, physical, 
propositional, and quantitative. If the specific phenomenal quality of greenness (for 
example) seems to convey privileged or ineffable information beyond that involved in the 
public analysis of light, this is because it also bears information about the organism’s 
internal communication system, its relationships to the world, its priorities and 
evolutionary history. One could compare this to the connotations of words implicit in 
their etymological history, in contrast to explicit dictionary definitions. 
 
 
5. Fiat 
 
I propose further that qualia in general involve the same sort of acts of fiat as 
demonstrated in the visual blind spot and other perceptual completion effects. In the case 
of the blind spot, the experience of continuity of the visual field is the brain’s way to 
represent to itself its (true) belief that (despite the blind spot) the external world is visibly 
continuous. The brain affirms that conviction by an act of fiat, which ignores the sensory 
discontinuity, or “fills in” phenomenal experience in the visual field between the 
enervated retinal areas on either side of the un-enervated area.14 However, all enervation 
is discrete, with gaps between receptors, which in turn must be “filled in” phenomenally, 
but on a finer scale, and temporally as well as spatially (so that there is continuity of 
motion). That is, in all cases the brain asserts continuity across discrete structures or 
events when their discreteness is irrelevant, just as it asserts continuity between frames of 
a motion picture. This is how the world has an analog look despite sensory digitation.  
 Such phenomenal assertion may be expressed propositionally. Suppose you notice 
a painting or photograph on the wall in your peripheral vision or from a distance. You 
might at first only recognize that it is a painting or photo, with a certain variety of colors 
and shapes and of a certain size. You perceive more when you approach or focus on a 
particular area; attention is directed to search out details within the limited visual area of 
the fovea. Noticing a “detail,” however, is much the same as noticing that it is a painting, 
but on a finer scale: in both cases it is a matter of making an assertion.15 “Seeing” a detail 
is seeing that something is so, just as you recognized that it was a painting. And seeing 
that something is so is a matter of cognitively deciding that it is so.16 In other words: an 
act of fiat. 
 The agent does not encounter its own representations, as one encounters external 
objects, but makes them as ongoing notations to itself. These tend by nature to be definite 
                                                
14 Dennett [1987] has famously criticized the notion of filling in, while others have disputed his 
interpretation. However interpreted, my point is that this phenomenal effect occurs broadly as a 
feature of perception. 
15 Even perceptual images are only relatively detailed. The impression of unlimited detail in 
sensory experience is illusory, since it is actually no more than the assertion that there is 
unlimited detail. This assertion is backed up by the fact that the senses (in contrast to mental 
images) can usually access additional information about the external world upon demand.  
16 This decisiveness gives perception its digital nature. One may speculate that qualia are built up 
essentially from primitive assertions at a lower level, in the way that a digital image is built from 
pixels [MacLennan 2005, sec3B]. Each “pixel” may represent a simple decision (1 or 0), to be 
integrated as the basis for assertions on higher levels. 
and decisive acts even when mistaken. In some anomalous cases there is no definitive 
assertion (as illustrated by the Necker cube and other ambivalent figures about which the 
brain cannot make up its mind). Yet, in the moment, until countermanded by further 
assertions, the act is made with the tautological, if provisional, finality of all declarations 
by fiat (such as the divine ‘Let there be light!’, the captain’s ‘Make it so!’, or the 
infamous ‘Let them eat cake!’). And it is only this act of fiat that makes it so, without 
which there could be no presentation in consciousness at all. This unequivocal action is 
the basis of phenomenality in particular and of the intentionality of mind in general. 
Without taking it into account, a traditionally causal explanation of consciousness and 
behavior alike remains unintelligible. With it, one can at least begin to grasp the brain’s 
challenges in terms that we can humanly relate to, since our very experience reflects the 
brain’s pragmatic solutions. 
 
 
5. Summary Conclusion 
 
For historical reasons, science has been largely preoccupied with efficient causation and 
the observer’s point of view, to the exclusion of teleology and subjectivity. By definition, 
such an approach precludes a scientific explanation of phenomenality. To overcome this 
obstacle to understanding consciousness scientifically, an “agent” approach is necessary 
(and perhaps sufficient). Even within a mechanistic framework, brain processes must be 
deemed to occur in an intentional system, whose agency must be considered from its own 
point of view. The human brain creates phenomenality as an efficient way to monitor the 
world, the body, and their ongoing relationship with respect to the future. Such conscious 
monitoring plays a role distinct from non-conscious behavior. A conscious physical 
system generates qualia by its own acts of fiat, effectively on a linguistic model, as 
internal notations. While conventional, the meanings of these notations are stably 
informed by the organism’s priorities, established through embodied participation in an 
evolutionary history. 
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